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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 05-5281
______________
NATHANIEL PARKER, SR.,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED
STATES; KATHLEEN HAWK, Director of the Fed. Bureau of Prisons; JOHN NASH,
Warden of FCI-Schuylkill; D. L. STINE, Associate Warden; DENEEN P. SWEET,
Associate Warden; A. MATEVOUSIAN, Captain of FCI-Schuylkill; JANE OR JOHN
DOE, BOP Health Service Medical Director; CHARLESTON IWUAGWU, Health
Services Clinical Director Administrator of FCI-Schuylkill; SANDRA VARGAS,
Assistant Health Services Adminst.; CEDRIC M. ROBINSON, IOP/ID Coordinator;
DAVID M. STEFFAN, Physician Assistant; MAYRSE WAMBACH, Physician
Assistant; BRIGIDA ZABALA, Physician Assistant; ISMAIL M. RAHIMI, Physician
Assistant; JANE AND JOHN DOES, Physician Assistant; JOHN DOES, Prison Guards
of FCI-Schuylkill; AMY KINDER, 4-A Unit Manager; COUNSELOR-BOP D. SHIRES,
4-A Unit Counselor, All in their individual and official capacities
___________
On Appeal From the United States District Court
For the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil No. 04-cv-0550)
District Judge: Honorable Edwin M. Kosik
____________
Submitted For Possible Dismissal Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Under Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
June 15, 2006
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO and ROTH, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 5, 2006)

_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
PER CURIAM
Nathaniel Parker appeals from two orders of United States District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment in favor of the defendants in
this pro se civil rights action. For the reasons that follow, we will summarily affirm.
I.
While incarcerated at FCI Schuylkill, Parker filed an action pursuant to Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971),
complaining about the use of over-tight handcuffs, the denial of adequate medical
treatment for sickle cell anemia, and retaliation – via assignment to an upper bunk in a
dorm with prisoners who smoked – for complaining about the allegedly inadequate
medical care. He named as defendants numerous Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) officials
and employees.1 Parker sought injunctive relief and compensatory and punitive damages.

1

Parker also named as defendants the United States of America, former Attorney
General John Ashcroft, Kathleen Hawk, the Director of the BOP, John Nash, the Warden
at FCI Schuylkill, and several John Doe prison employees. For essentially the reasons
provided by the District Court, we agree that these defendants were properly dismissed.
The United States is protected from suit by sovereign immunity, and there is no explicit
waiver in this case. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994). Despite ample
opportunity to do so, the John Doe defendants were never identified and served with the
complaint. Parker has not offered any reason why he could not have identified and
properly served these defendants, who are physician assistants and prison guards at FCI
Schuylkill. With respect to Attorney General Ashcroft, BOP Director Hawk, and Warden
Nash, there is no evidence that any of them played a role in the incidents underlying
2

The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment. By order entered February
23, 2005, the District Court granted the motion as to all defendants with the exception of
A. Matevousian, the prison employee who allegedly handcuffed Parker too tightly. In
particular, the District Court concluded that prison medical records “belied” Parker’s
contention that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need.
Summary judgment was likewise held to be warranted with respect to Parker’s retaliation
claims insofar as there was no evidence that his bed and housing assignment were
changed because of his medical complaints. The District Court also construed Parker’s
complaint as raising an excessive force claim against Matevousian.2 Because the
defendants had not read Parker’s complaint as raising such a claim, the District Court
provided them additional time to file dispositive motions. Parker filed a motion for
reconsideration of the District Court’s order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). The defendants
moved for summary judgment, alleging that Parker had not administratively exhausted his
excessive force claim. On October 13, 2005, the District Court denied the motion for
reconsideration and granted Matevousian’s motion for summary judgment. Parker timely

Parker’s complaint. Because liability under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of
Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), may not based on the doctrine of respondeat
superior, these defendants were properly dismissed.
2

Although Parker’s complaint alluded to an excessive force claim, he did not
specifically refer to such a claim until opposing the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.
3

appealed.3
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary review over an
order granting a motion for summary judgment. See Gallo v. City of Philadelphia, 161
F.3d 217, 221 (3d Cir. 1998). A grant of summary judgment will be affirmed if our
review reveals that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). We review the
facts in the light most favorable to the party against whom summary judgment was
entered. See Coolspring Stone Supply, Inc. v. American States Life Ins. Co., 10 F.3d
144, 146 (3d Cir. 1993).
III.
Parker claimed that on September 11, 2002, defendant Matevousian, who was
escorting Parker to the Special Housing Unit (“SHU”), handcuffed him too tightly,
cutting his right wrist and causing bleeding. Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act
(“PLRA”), exhaustion of administrative remedies is required for all actions concerning
prison conditions brought under federal law. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Spruill v. Gillis,
372 F.3d 218, 227 (3d Cir. 2004). In Spruill, we held that the PLRA required “proper”
exhaustion, meaning that the inmate must follow the procedural requirements of the

3

Although Parker’s notice of appeal states that he is appealing only the order of
October 13, 2005, this Court also has jurisdiction to review the District Court’s February
23, 2005 order granting summary judgment as to all but one defendant. See Williams v.
Guzzardi, 875 F.2d 46 (3d Cir. 1989)
4

prison grievance system. Spruill, 372 F.3d at 228, 231. If the prisoner fails to follow the
procedural requirements, then his claims are procedurally defaulted. The BOP has

established an administrative remedy procedure, set forth at 28 C.F.R. §§ 542 et seq. A
review of the record indicates that Parker has made no attempt to avail himself of this
administrative process with respect to the alleged wrist injury caused by tight handcuffs.
Thus, his excessive force claim was properly dismissed for failure to exhaust available
administrative remedies.
IV.
Parker also claimed that prison employees inadequately treated him for a pain
episode related to sickle cell anemia, which began on September 22, 2002, while he was
confined in the SHU. The Eighth Amendment requires prison officials to provide basic
medical treatment to inmates. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976). In order to
show a violation of the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner must show that prison officials
were deliberately indifferent to the prisoner’s serious medical needs. Id. at 104. Because
we can assume for purposes of our analysis that Parker’s sickle cell anemia presented an
objectively serious medical condition, we focus upon whether the conduct of the prison
employees amounted to deliberate indifference. We have found deliberate indifference
where a prison official: 1) knows of a prisoner’s need for medical treatment but
intentionally refuses to provide it; 2) delays necessary medical treatment for non-medical
reasons; or 3) prevents a prisoner from receiving needed or recommended treatment. See
Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999). Non-physician defendants generally
5

are not deliberately indifferent where they do not respond to the medical complaints of a
prisoner who is being treated by a prison doctor. See Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64,
69 (3d Cir. 1993).
As thoroughly discussed in the District Court’s opinion, affidavits submitted by the
defendants show that Parker received treatment for his ailment. In response to Parker’s
initial complaints of discomfort, a physician’s assistant examined him and directed him to
increase his fluids and to take ibuprofen, folic acid, and multivitamins. The next day,
Parker was examined by another physician’s assistant who prescribed Vistaril, an antianxiety medication that may also increase the effects of pain medications. Although
Parker alleged that his repeated requests for medical assistance were ignored while he
was in the SHU, he did admit that he was seen by physician’s assistants and was provided
with various medications. Furthermore, Parker continued to receive treatment from a
doctor following his release from the SHU. Although Parker may have preferred a
different course of treatment, his preference does not establish a cause of action. See
Inmates of Allegheny Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 762 (3d Cir. 1979) (courts will
“disavow any attempt to second-guess the propriety or adequacy of a particular course of
treatment . . . [which] remains a question of sound professional judgment”) (citations
omitted); see also White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (doctor’s choice
of one drug over another is not actionable). Because Parker pointed to no evidence
supporting the contention that prison employees knew of and disregarded an excessive
risk to his health, see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994) (defining deliberate
6

indifference), the District Court properly granted the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment on this claim.
V.
Finally, Parker claimed that upon being transferred from the SHU to the general
prison population on October 3, 2002, he was assigned to an upper bunk in an area where
prisoners smoked in retaliation for complaining about inadequate medical care. We
conclude that this claim falters under the test we reiterated in Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d
330 (3d Cir. 2001). Parker failed to allege any causal connection between his medical
treatment complaints and determinations regarding his housing conditions. The record
shows that Parker, who was limited to the least preferred housing status, was assigned to
a non-smoking area upon his return to the general population; he received an upper bunk
because it was the only one available. See id. 241 F.3d at 334 (holding that even if “a
prisoner demonstrates that his exercise of a constitutional right was a substantial or
motivating factor in the challenged decision, the prison officials may still prevail by
proving that they would have made the same decision absent the protected conduct for
reasons reasonably related to a legitimate penological interest”). In support of his
retaliation claim, Parker submitted BOP forms authorizing a lower bunk assignment.
Notably, however, those forms pertain to periods after Parker was released from the SHU.
The District Court thus properly granted summary judgment on Parker’s retaliation claim.
VI.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude the appeal presents no substantial question.
7

Accordingly, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6.
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